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ZONING AND THE
LOCATION OF
RELIGIOUS
ESTABLISHMENTS
KENNETH PEARLMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Zoning regulation has begun to run into challenges on a number of
grounds. Of increasing significance are challenges based on the free
speech and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.' Although both
sets of rights are of substantial importance, it is interesting to note that
the Supreme Court has spoken at great length on the subject of zoning
and free speech2 as have the lower federal courts.3 In recent years, how-
ever, the Court has consistently declined to hear zoning cases involving
the free exercise clause. 4
* Professor of City and Regional Planning and Adjunct Professor of the College of Law,
Ohio State University; A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1964; J.D., Columbia University,
1967; M.C.P., University of Pennsylvania, 1974.
The author would like to thank Marcia Caton Campbell for assistance in the research
and preparation of the footnotes.
See Pearlman, Zoning and the First Amendment, 16 URB. LAw. 217 (1984) (discussion of
issues relating to free speech and land use).
" See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
' See Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981); John Donnelly &
Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981); Entertainment Con-
cepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981);
Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 531 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Minn. 1982); Basiardanes v. City of
Galveston, 514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 682 F.2d 1203
(5th Cir. 1982); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
" See Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
827 (1984); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Marsland v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 657 P.2d 1035, appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 805
(1983); Lubavitch Chabad House of Ill.; Inc. v. City of Evanston, 112 Ill. App. 3d 223, 445
N.E.2d 343 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Medford Assembly of God v. City of
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The refusal to hear cases in this area presents a number of problems.
Unlike the area of free speech where there is substantial, although some-
times confusing, federal precedent to provide guidance, the domain of the
free exercise clause involves mostly state court decisions. These state
court decisions, based largely on interpretations of the police power
rather than the free exercise clause, reflect the law as it has developed in
particular jurisdictions. This means that the power of a local jurisdiction
to control land use where religious institutions are concerned may differ
significantly from state to state, even though free exercise of religion is a
federal constitutional right which was deemed applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment as long ago as 1940 in Cantwell v.
Connecticut.5 Indeed, certain positions have become specifically identifi-
able with certain states: there is a New York position, a California posi-
tion, and so forth.
This situation might be understandable if there were relatively few
zoning cases. On the contrary, the use of constitutional arguments to raise
challenges to zoning ordinances has increased. The number of freedom of
religion cases has also increased; thus it seems almost shocking that in
1983 a federal court, deciding a free exercise question involving the exclu-
sion of all church buildings from residential areas of a city, could state
that "no other federal circuit court has resolved the question."'
Undoubtedly, there are reasons for the current state of affairs and
such reasons will be discussed in this article. First, this article will ex-
amine the free exercise clause in the light of its underlying values. Next,
the various positions taken by state and federal courts in relation to zon-
ing regulation and the free exercise clause will be examined. Finally, some
suggestions regarding a way out of the doctrinal thicket that envelopes
the area at the moment will be offered.
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The first amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof .... "7 As the Supreme Court has noted,
"[t]he language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best
opaque, particularly when compared with other portions of the Amend-
ment."8 Nonetheless, there has been sufficient law produced under the
cases to warrant some generalizations. Unfortunately, very little of this
Medford, 72 Or. App. 333, 695 P.2d 1379, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985).
- 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
6 See Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 304.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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law pertains to the land use context, and land use law has sufficiently
distinct characteristics such that it is difficult to apply to it a general
branch of law.'
An analysis of the free exercise clause'0 begins with the notion that
the clause prevents governmental regulation of religious beliefs." There-
fore, the government cannot compel affirmation of belief'2 or discriminate
against individuals who hold abhorrent views." In addition, it cannot use
the taxing power to inhibit dissemination of religious views."'
If a state government regulation interferes with the free exercise of
religion, this regulation can be upheld only upon a showing that it is jus-
tified by a compelling state interest." This means that only "those inter-
ests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."' 6 Moreover, a regulation
which is neutral on its face may be applied in a manner which is unduly
burdensome to the free exercise of religion and, thus, may run afoul of
the clause.' Reasonable state regulation of religion, however, is allowed if
it is based on purely secular considerations and not on religious belief.'8
Finally, the free exercise clause cannot be used to dictate how govern-
ment procedures will be conducted. 9 In short, the courts are to chart a
course that preserves religious freedom and yet avoids a semblance of es-
tablished religion.2
0
' See generally Pearlman, supra note 1, passim (discussion of the free speech aspects of the
first amendment); Pearlman, Section 1983 and the Liability of Local Officials for Land Use
Decisions, 23 URB. L. ANN. 57, 88-101 (1982) (federal approach to local zoning actions).
1" In general, the establishment clause will not be involved in land use cases. A discussion of
the relationship between the free exercise and establishment clauses is found in Reynolds,
Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First Amendment, 64 B.U.L. REV. 767,
797-805 (1985).
" See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'" See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
"3 See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
" See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 578 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
1" United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employ-
ment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
" See id. at 220. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (must look to both
purpose and effect).
"8 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20.
" See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (government can require persons applying for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children to furnish social security numbers in spite of belief
that assigning a child a number will affect the child's spirit).
"0 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970)).
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III. THE STATE CASES
As noted above, the vast majority of cases relating to zoning regula-
tion and the free exercise clause are state cases. There are two principal
lines of decision which have become notable: the New York and the Cali-
fornia cases. They represent extremes. Other states tend to fall into one
of the two camps; relatively few of those other states present a clear and
independent rationale for their decisions.
A. The New York Position
The most restrictive position, as well as the majority position, taken
by the states is that of New York. This position gives considerable defer-
ence to religious uses and is reflected in a long line of cases beginning in
1956 with Community Synagogue v. Bates.2 In Community Synagogue,
a synagogue applied for a change of use permit, which would allow the
transformation of a one-family dwelling in a residential district into a
church use, and requested a number of variances as well. The use was to
be solely for public worship and other "strictly religious uses"22 including
a religious school and men's and women's social clubs.
After finding evidence indicating that the building would not meet
fire laws, the town board denied the application and the decision was up-
held by the appellate division.2 The board made a number of findings
concerning the proposed use, including the fact that the use would serve
other than religious purposes and that the use was out of character with
the district and, thus, would not promote the general welfare.
The court of appeals rejected both of these contentions and con-
cluded that religious uses include social groups and more than pure activ-
ities of worship. As to the findings respecting the character of the area,
the court of appeals stated that no factual foundation for such findings
was discovered in the record. The court also held that the board could not
require the synagogue to submit plans for a zoning change which showed
that the facility would comply with the building code's requirements for
fire safety.
If the court had merely stopped at this point, Community Synagogue
would be of relatively little importance; the court could have simply con-
cluded that the board misinterpreted its own ordinance or placed unrea-
sonable restrictions on the applicant-restrictions that might have been
unreasonable for a non-religious application as well. The court, however,
went on to equate its decision with the essence of religious freedom: "The
men and women who left Scrooby for Leyden and eventually came to
21 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).
22 Id. at 448, 136 N.E.2d at 490, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
" Id. at 450, 136 N.E.2d at 491, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
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Plymouth in order to worship God where they wished and in their own
way must have thought they had terminated the interference of public
authorities with free and unhandicapped exercise of religion."24
The court rejected the argument that the village had the right to re-
fuse a religious use at a "precise spot." This, the court concluded, would
give the village the right to determine exactly where a religious establish-
ment could be located and such action by the village would interfere with
the free exercise clause of the New York Constitution. This conclusion
represents a jump across a vast gap in logic since no such issue was really
presented in the case, but it was not until later cases that the court would
articulate its reasoning more firmly.
In a similar case decided the same day, Diocese of Rochester v. Plan-
ning Board,5 the New York court further confused the issues. In this
case, the court did not base its decision on the free exercise clause but,
presumptively, reached its decision by using traditional police power
standards.2 6 Under an ordinance allowing certain uses including fire sta-
tions, municipal buildings, police stations, park buildings, and educa-
tional or religious buildings if approved by the planning board, the Town
of Brighton denied a permit for the construction of a church. The board
concluded that, since the area in question was almost totally developed
with residential property, a church would change the character of the
area; good planning required that churches be built in future subdivisions
which could be properly designed to accommodate such churches.
The court concluded that wholly excluding a church from a residen-
tial area bore no reasonable relationship to the police power. From the
board's reluctance to allow a church in this built-up area, the court in-
ferred that the board was acting on the principle that churches could only
be constructed in sparsely populated areas. In addition, the court felt
that, in light of the purposes of a church, the fact that there would be
"pecuniary loss to a few persons"2 7 should not bar church uses; the loss of
tax revenue, since under New York tax law churches were exempt from
property taxation, was irrelevant; and increased noise and traffic conges-
tion was an insufficient reason for denying a permit to a church. The
24 Id. at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
22 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
2" Id. at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863. For procedural reasons, the court did
not reach the constitutionality of the ordinance and decided the case on traditional police
power grounds. Id. The lower courts found that constitutional issues could not be raised
since the case was an attack on the discretion of the town planning board and that this
attack assumes the constitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 519, 136 N.E.2d at 832, 154
N.Y.S.2d at 856. The court of appeals, in addition, decided not to consider whether the
standards under which the board decided the case were unconstitutionally vague.
11 Id. at 524, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
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court, noting that the "church is the teacher and guardian of morals,"2
clearly gave a substantial weight to the church's role in society.
Community Synagogue and Diocese of Rochester, viewed together,
reveal the position of the New York courts toward land use restrictions
on religious establishments. In at least one subsequent case, however, a
New York court recognized that communities do have valid police power
concerns in connection with religious establishments, which concerns
must be balanced with religious expectations under the free exercise
clause. The fact that this balance is not exactly an even one was clarified
by the New York Court of Appeals in Westchester Reform Temple v.
Brown.2" There the court stated that land use considerations are "simply
... outweighed by the constitutional prohibition against the abridgement
of the free exercise of religion and by the public benefit and welfare
which is itself an attribute of religious worship in a community.""0 This
language reinforces the notion that New York courts consider churches so
vital to the public interest that, despite efforts to exercise authority under
the police power, communities are virtually compelled to allow churches
in residential districts. This is certainly an extraordinary notion, espe-
cially since other critical uses, such as hospitals and schools, do not neces-
sarily have a similar status. Moreover, it is submitted that it is one thing
for the court to apply the free exercise clause but quite another to appar-
ently usurp a community's ability to determine what constitutes public
health, safety, morals, and welfare.
There is still room under Westchester Reform for a community to
place restrictions on religious establishments by exercising police power
authority but, where there is an irreconcilable conflict, regulation must
yield to religion. The extent to which this doctrine can be carried is un-
clear since there must certainly be circumstances (for example, if very
serious traffic hazards could occur) where the court would agree that the
police power must prevail. A case of this type, however, remains to be
heard by the New York Court of Appeals. One cannot be sanguine about
this situation because in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, Inc. v. In-
corporated Village of Roslyn Harbor,"1 the New York Court of Appeals
held that a town may not deny a variance with respect to setback lines to
a religious establishment in a residential area before the town has made
Id. at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (citing State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v.
Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942)). It should be noted that while Synod seems
to support the New York case, there was evidence in that case that the area was not built up
and that the church in question had made substantial efforts to deal with traffic, noise, and
congestion. Synod, 139 Ohio St. at 247-49, 39 N.E.2d at 523.
29 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
Id. at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950
(1976).
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serious attempts to mitigate impacts. It is especially relevant that the
court held in favor of the synagogue even though only four percent of its
members lived in the town. The court so held despite the fact that the
zoning board had not been given the authority to vary setback require-
ments and had found that, even if it had the power, it would have denied
the variance because of the impacts created by the synagogue on traffic
and the lack of sufficient water pressure in nearby fire hydrants.
The court touched all bases in its decision. First, the court concluded
that the ordinance required the board to turn down a variance request by
a religious institution if any detrimental effect were possible. In addition,
the court engaged in a tortured example of logic. The synagogue would sit
twenty-nine feet from its property line if the variance was granted, in-
stead of 100 feet if it were not. According to the court, the ordinance
required homes to be twenty-five feet away from the property line. There-
fore, the minimum requirement for separation between a church and a
home would normally be 125 feet. Since, if the variance was granted, the
nearest house would be 106 feet away, the court concluded that there
would be "a mere 19-foot discrepancy between reality and the village's
own statutory ideal." '
Impacts between a church and a property, however, are not confined
to impacts between the church and the house alone. It seems logical for a
community to conclude that adverse effects could arise from church
buildings less than 100 feet from a property line, regardless of the dis-
tance of the church from any house. By turning the separation from prop-
erty line requirement into one based on distance from living quarters, the
court, attempting to justify its approach, misses the point.
Dissenting views were also expressed and sounded the call that "the
time has come ... to breathe vitality into the so far lifeless" doctrine that
churches can be subject to appropriate restrictions.3 The dissenting
judges urged that New York should adopt the view that religious institu-
tions may be subject to reasonable regulation, especially in a case where
there is no total exclusion from a residential district. They accepted the
notion that churches occupy a special position but pointed out that, in
many cases in the past, issues have been examined from the standpoint of
religious users rather than uses. Religious and non-religious uses should
be examined in the same manner; many religious uses are no different
from similar uses by non-religious bodies.
.The force of the court of appeals' decisions has been such that the
32 Id. at 290, 342 N.E.2d at 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
Id. at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Jones, J., dissenting). The doctrine of
appropriate restrictions refers to language of Judge Froessel in Diocese of Rochester v. Plan-
ning Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 862-63 (1956).
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lower courts have continued to follow the higher court,"' with only a rare
case resulting in a decision which is unfavorable to a church. In Holy
Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity v. Rosen-
feld,3 a lower court denied a request by a church to establish a training
and recruitment center in a town. Although stressing the community's
duty to try to minimize adverse impacts on the town and simultaneoulsy
make every effort to accommodate a religious use (even where an unpopu-
lar church provokes hostile reaction from the community)," the court
found that a religious institution's right to special treatment in zoning
will not survive misrepresentation, fraud or deceit. In this case, the
church made a number of misrepresentations. It promised that it would
not conduct workshops while its permit application was pending but, in
fact, conducted ten to twelve such events. The church also agreed that no
more than three people unrelated by blood or marriage would reside in
the church while the application was pending. Nonetheless, evidence re-
vealed ten beds in the church, and the church admitted that six people
were residing on the property.
Under the circumstances, the court found that the zoning board
could properly conclude that the church would not comply with whatever
conditions might be imposed on its use of the property.3" The court did
not offer any guidance as to how the church might rectify this situation or
the extent to which perceived intent may be a factor for a zoning board to
consider. Presumably, only misrepresentation, fraud or deceit would be
sufficient grounds and this would still be consistent with the New York
zoning decisions.
In essence, in spite of some arguments for change, the New York
Court of Appeals allows little or no zoning regulation of churches.
" See Islamic Soc'y of Westchester & Rockland, Inc. v. Foley, 96 App. Div. 2d 536, 464
N.Y.S.2d 844 (2d Dep't 1983); American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pius, Inc. v. Schwab, 68
App. Div. 2d 646, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1979); Covenant Community Church, Inc. v.
Town of Gates Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 111 Misc. 2d 537, 444 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1981). However, some New York courts have allowed reasonable regulation of
churches. See Seaford Jewish Center, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 48 App. Div. 2d 686,
368 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2d Dep't 1975); Congregation Gates of Prayer v. Board of Appeals, 48 App.
Div. 2d 679, 368 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1975); Rhema Christian Fellowship v. Common
Council, 114 Misc. 2d 710, 452 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1982).
" 91 App. Div. 2d 190, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1983).
36 See id. at 199, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
31 Id. at 201, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court, citing Bell v. Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor, 20 N.Y.2d 54, 228 N.E.2d 758, 281 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1967), and Ostroff v. Sacks,
64 App. Div. 2d 708, 407 N.Y.S.2d 546 (2d Dep't 1978), also concluded that revocation of the
permit was justified based upon deceit. Id.
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B. The California Position
In California, unlike New York, the state courts give substantial
weight to local legislative judgments and do not single out religious insti-
tutions for special treatment. As long ago as 1949, in Corporation of Pre-
siding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of
Porterville,3" a California court held that churches could be excluded
from single-family districts provided that the legislative body of a com-
munity made a valid judgement that churches in such districts would cre-
ate problems related to traffic, parking, and noise. The court stated that
"[t]hese and many other factors may well enter into the determination of
the legislative body in drawing the lines between districts, a determina-
tion primarily the province of the city.""9 The underlying rationale was
simply that a comprehensive zoning district with single-family homes
only is a valid residential district." According to the court, regulating re-
ligious institutions through a zoning ordinance is no different than regu-
lating these institutions by requiring them to conform to a local building
code. In response to the argument that such regulation is an unwarranted
restriction on religious worship, the court maintained that the denial of a
permit is not a prohibition against religious worship and the record con-
tained no evidence that the church building could not be erected in an
appropriate district. The burden, as in most zoning cases, was on the
plaintiff to show that the ordinance was unreasonable and this plaintiff,
the church, failed to make such a showing.
One major issue, which was not decided in the case, was whether ex-
cluding church buildings from virtually all residential areas of the city
would be unconstitutional. The court declined to decide this issue on pro-
cedural grounds. The Porterville case was ultimately appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, where it was dismissed for lack of a sub-
stantial federal question."1 Since Porterville, the California courts have
continued to support the position that municipalities have the right to
exclude churches from residential zones."' Moreover, the relevant cases
have clarified the extent to which the California courts are prepared to
8 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
"o Id. at 659, 203 P.2d at 825.
40 Id. (citing Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925)).
41 Porterville, 338 U.S. 805 (1949). See also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 397 (1950) (citing Porterville to show that a "rigid test requiring a showing of
imminent danger to the security of the Nation is an absurdity.").
4" Garden Grove Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Garden Grove, 176 Cal.
App. 2d 136, 1 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1959); Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d
255 (1958); City of Chico v. First Ave. Baptist Church, 108 Cal. App. 2d 297, 238 P.2d 587
(1951).
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go. In Minney v. City of Azusa," the court, citing Porterville, held that a
church was not entitled to a use variance in a single-family zone." The
court concluded that there is significant constitutional support for treat-
ing religious groups similarly to other land users.45 The court stated that
the majority position of disallowing restriction of churches is an extreme
viewpoint which ignores the basis of modern day zoning and permits
church groups to act in a manner which may not be in the best interests
of the community.
The Minney court held that churches could be excluded from single-
family districts even where other, non-single family uses were allowed. In
this case, agricultural and horticultural uses, libraries, museums, parks,
playgrounds, and public schools were permitted. There must, however, be
a rational basis for the classification. Furthermore, when attacking a re-
fusal to grant a variance, a church is in no better position than any other
potential user with respect to typical variance standards and the burden
of proving an abuse of discretion."' Under Porterville, California courts
have also held that churches are entitled to no better treatment when
applying for special use permits. 7
The California court decisions contrast sharply with the New York
reasoning. In Holy Spirit" the New York court upheld a town's refusal to
allow communal living because of misrepresentation. However, the New
York decisions make clear that in this jurisdiction the types of activities
which a community can prohibit are those which pose a substantial threat
to public safety or order. Therefore, religious groups which practice po-
lygamy or snake handling, use peyote, or refuse compulsory secondary ed-
'3 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958).
41 See id. at 21-24, 330 P.2d at 259-61. The court also cited West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (religious organizations do not enjoy unlim-
ited freedom); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (regulations to impose order
are lawful); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (community may regulate
time, place, and manner of religious expression and may safeguard good order of
community).
" Minney, 164 Cal. App. 2d at 24-26, 330 P.2d at 260-61. See also State ex rel. Wenatchee
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d 378, 381, 312 P.2d
195, 197 (1957).
" Minney, 164 Cal. App. 2d at 24, 330 P.2d at 261.
" See Garden Grove Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Garden Grove, 176 Cal.
App. 2d 136, 1 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1959); City of Chico v. First Ave. Baptist Church, 108 Cal.
App. 2d 297, 238 P.2d 587 (1951). But where local ordinances so permit, subject to certain
restrictions, a church may have a right to a special use permit. See Redwood City Co. of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Menlo Park, 167 Cal. App. 2d 686, 335 P.2d 195 (1959).
For a discussion of conditional use permits, see 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF
PLANNING AND ZONING § 20.01 (4th ed. Supp. 1987), which indicates that, while conditional
use regulation is a widely accepted position, the practice can vary depending on whether the
state is a majority or minority jurisdiction.
, 91 App. Div. 2d 190, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1983).
31 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
ucation may be subject to justifiable constitutional regulation.4" Other-
wise, even where there is evidence that a particular religious regimen may
not be beneficial to religious members and may even harm some people,
the Holy Spirit decision would prohibit harmful uses only where the
health or life of an "average" participant may be endangered.50
The California cases, while presenting a strong position in favor of
restriction of religious uses, do not totally ignore the special role of
churches. In Garden Grove Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City
of Garden Grove,"' a California court explicitly recognized that religious
values may be of a special nature. The court accepted the church's argu-
ment that religious establishments are favored by law and not considered
objectionable. The court stated that it "is entirely in accord with those
principles."5 2 The court, however, emphasized that the appropriate place
to consider those principles and weigh them along with other factors is at
the planning commission level (the case involved a special use permit). In
essence, the special status of churches cannot be totally ignored, but must
be examined in the light of compatibility with the city's overall land use
scheme. As long as the local body has considered this, a California court
will likely uphold a reasonable decision.
C. Other Jurisdictions
The California and New York cases represent the two major lines of
decision." Other state courts have issued decisions that appear to sketch
out a middle ground, but they are not definitive in this area and are few
in number." One commentator has noted that many of these cases can be
" See id. at 198, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
50 Id. at 199, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 926. The court, discussing a training regimen, stated that in
isolated instances participants may have psychotic episodes or become suicidal. The "evi-
dence did not establish, however, that the average participant is in imminent danger of
losing his, or her, life or health. The participants in the retreat workshops of the Unification
Church are adults, with the constitutional right to choose their own life-styles." Id.
176 Cal. App. 2d 136, 1 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1959).
82 Id. at 143, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
53 There are a few courts which accept the California position; allowing the exclusion of
churches from residential districts, especially where the community provides an alternate
location. See Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
803 (1980); Medford Assembly of God v. City of Medford, 72 Or. App. 333, 695 P.2d 1379,
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985).
" See Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982); Abram v. City of
Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983); East Side Baptist Church of Denver, Inc.
v. Klein, 175 Colo. 168, 487 P.2d 549 (1971); St. John's Roman Catholic Church Corp. v.
Town of Darien, 149 Conn. 712, 184 A.2d 42 (1962); West Hartford Methodist Church v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956); Hull v. Miami Shores Village,
435 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Northeast Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Salem,
59 Or. App. 499, 651 P.2d 193 (1982); Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Commonwealth, 75
ZONING
analyzed as based on other grounds related to the specific facts of the
cases for procedural as well as substantive reasons." Nonetheless, this
same commentator suggests that the preferred status of religion in Ameri-
can life plays a major role in these cases."
The cases are sometimes based on the weighing of land use policy
objectives against religious objectives. For example, in West Hartford
Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals,57 a Connecticut court
concluded that a zoning board could deny a special use permit where evi-
dence indicated that allowing a church at a proposed location would sub-
ject homes to substantial additional traffic, lack of privacy, and losses in
property values.58 Other courts have held that furthering land use objec-
tives may be a reason for denying a church use in at least certain portions
of a city;" that a community may refuse to allow a church to use a prop-
erty where a major part of the use was for administrative purposes;10 and
that a community may refuse to allow a church to operate in violation of
fire safety requirements.6 1 These cases represent a small movement to-
ward a balancing position.2 Despite this movement, there is no clear
trend at the state level.
Pa. Commw. 61, 460 A.2d 1228 (1983); City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d
415 (1944); State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Bd. of Trustees, 12
Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288 (1961).
"' See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 776-77.
6 Id.
"7 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956).
8 Id. at 268-69, 121 A.2d at 642. Cf. St. John's Roman Catholic Church Corp. v. Town of
Darien, 149 Conn. 712, 724-26, 184 A.2d 42, 47-49 (1962) (zoning ordinance which requires
special permit for construction of parochial school does not deprive applicant of property
without due process).
" See Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
"0 Hull v. Miami Shores Village, 435 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
", Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. Commw. 61, 460 A.2d 1228
(1983). However, in City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358
(1982), the Supreme Court of Washington held that, if a religious institution is involved,
there must be an attempt to show that the standards of a fire and safety code are, in fact,
necessary. Id. at 8, 639 P.2d at 1362-63.
0" It remains uncertain whether the movement toward a balancing position will grow. In
New Jersey, a lower court decision reflecting acceptance of the balancing position was re-
cently overturned by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See State v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super.
66, 445 A.2d 75 (Law Div. 1982), aff'd, 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1983),
rev'd, 100 N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985). In this case the court objected to zoning ordi-
nances that exclude churches from residential districts. The court based its decision on the
New Jersey and United States Constitutions. Cameron was followed by another New Jersey
lower court decision that overturned an ordinace prohibiting religious services in private
homes on the grounds that such ordinance violated the New Jersey Constitution's free exer-
cise of religion clause. See Farhi v. Commissioners of Borough of Deal, 204 N.J. Super. 575,
499 A.2d 559 (Law Div. 1985).
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IV. THE FEDERAL CASES
A. General Issues
Although there are relatively few federal cases on the topic, the trend
in federal courts has been adherence to the basic notion of a balancing
test. The balancing test evolved from a series of Supreme Court decisions
dating back to Cantwell v. Connecticut." In Cantwell, the Supreme
Court reversed the convictions of three Jehovah's Witnesses for breach of
peace and solicitation without a license on the grounds that the govern-
ment's action went beyond the least intrusive means. Subsequently, in
Braunfeld v. Brown,"' the Supreme Court considered a Pennsylvania law
prohibiting the Sunday retail sale of certain goods and rejected the chal-
lenge of an Orthodox Jewish merchant. The merchant contended that he
would suffer economic loss because he was unable to work on Saturday
(Orthodox Jews are not permitted by their religious precepts to work on
Saturdays) and would thus be forced to choose between his religion and
serious economic disadvantage. Upon determining that the government
can regulate conduct which is "found to be in violation of important so-
cial duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are de-
manded by one's religion,"" the Court concluded that the law required
some sacrifice on the part of the merchant but did not force a clear-cut
choice between religion and financial gain. The Court held that where a
state enacts a law with a secular purpose (in this case, to provide a day of
rest for all businesses), the law is valid despite any indirect burden on
religious observance unless the state can achieve its purposes by means
imposing a lesser burden."
The rather loose requirements of Braunfeld were tightened in Sher-
bert v. Verner." There the Court considered a South Carolina law which
required claimants for unemployment compensation to be available for
work. If such claimants failed without good cause to accept suitable work,
they would be ineligible for benefits. The plaintiff was a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church and refused to work on Saturday. The
Court enunciated the compelling state interest test for cases of this na-
ture; the state law was valid if it did not infringe upon the free exercise of
religion or, if it did infringe, was justified by a compelling state interest."
Upon finding that the plaintiffs ineligibility for benefits was solely
the result of a religious practice, the Court concluded that the South Car-
" 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
64 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
65 Id. at 603-04.
6 Id. at 607 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940)).
67 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6 Id. at 403.
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olina law represented a burden, even though the impact on religion was
only an indirect result of the state law. Using the balancing test, the
Court further found a strong state interest in providing a day of rest from
work and that allowing days of rest other than Sunday could result in
administrative problems of great magnitude. The Court clearly did not
overrule Braunfeld. Instead, the Sherbert decision reflects change with
respect to the Court's adoption of the compelling state interest test in
cases where there is a burden on the free exercise of religion. This deci-
sion is not without its problems and has been a source of doctrinal
confusion. 9
Sherbert was followed by Wisconsin v. Yoder,7 0 wherein the Court
considered the claim of an Amish church that a Wisconsin compulsory
school attendance law violated free exercise rights. The Court stated that
the law could stand if it did not abridge the free exercise of religion by its
requirements or if the state's interest in education was of sufficient mag-
nitude to override the protected interest. The Court concluded that the
traditional Amish way of life was not merely one of personal preference
but was deeply grounded in religious conviction. Amish religious laws not
only affected belief but also were pervasive throughout the entire Amish
way of life. The Court found that compulsory school attendance would
create a real threat of undermining the Amish community, forcing the
Amish to abandon belief or migrate to another state with no such legal
requirement.
Regarding the state's claim that compulsory education was of great
importance, the Court determined that the additional education required
by the state7 1 (beyond the eighth grade) was of lesser magnitude. The
justification proffered for the requirement was the necessity of preparing
children for the modern world, but the Amish were preparing their chil-
dren for a different way of life. In Yoder, therefore, the Court set forth
the foundation of free exercise analysis. The free exercise clause means
that government cannot force an individual to choose between basic reli-
" There is substantial commentary on this subject. See Pepper, The Conundrum of the
Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. REV. 265 (1982); Pep-
per, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L.
REV. 309; Note, United States v. Lee: Limitations on the Free Exercise of Religion, 28 Loy.
L. REV. 1216 (1982); Note, Constitutional Law and The Religion Clauses-A Free Reign to
Free Exercise?, 11 STETSON L. REV. 386 (1982); Note, Zoning Ordinances Affecting
Churches: A Proposal for Expanded Free Exercise Protection, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1131
(1984); Note, Constitutional Review of Building Codes and Zoning Ordinances Applied to
Parochial Schools: City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 607
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Review].
70 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
7 The Amish did not object to school at an elementary level, but felt that further school
was a threat. Id. at 212.
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gious beliefs and living in society unless there is a compelling reason for
requiring this choice. The Court did not deal with the aspect of Sherbert
relating to direct or indirect effect on religion, which aspect would be
dealt with in later cases.
The presumptive validity that the Court had laid down in Braunfeld
was thus undercut. It was further undercut in Thomas v. Review Board of
Indiana Employment Security Division72 where the Court struck down a
state's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an employee
who, based upon his religious beliefs, quit his job because it related to the
production of weapons. The Court, on the basis of Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, held that religious beliefs need not be consistent or
logical to qualify for first amendment protection and that the employee's
free exercise rights had been violated. Moreover, one can define the ex-
tent to which his religious beliefs have been affected; the plaintiff was
permitted to assert that producing the raw material for tanks did not vio-
late his religious beliefs whereas actually producing turrets for tanks did.
In addition, the plaintiff was protected even if other practitioners of his
religion did not agree with him on this point.
In Thomas, the Court again concluded that a person may not be
compelled to choose between the exercise of a first amendment right and
participation in a public program. Of greater significance was the fact
that the Court further weakened the direct-indirect effect distinction of
Braunfeld (although, once again, without specifically overruling it). The
ultimate issue was one of coercive effect. If the effect is substantial, a
violation may exist regardless of whether the effect is direct or indirect.
Rejecting the state's arguments that a decision favorable to .the plaintiff
could result in widespread unemployment or significant probing by em-
ployers into the religious beliefs of job applicants, the Court failed to dis-
cern a compelling governmental interest. Both arguments were rejected
on grounds of insufficient evidence.
Another important recent case was United States v. Lee.7 3 An Amish
farmer failed to withhold social security taxes from his employees because
payment of the taxes and receipt of the benefits would violate the Amish
faith. While the social security system provided exemptions for self-em-
ployed persons on religious grounds, it did not do so where a commercial
enterprise with employees was involved. Although the Court followed pre-
cedent by determining whether a burden on religion could result from
compulsory participation, it proceeded to find a compelling governmental
interest in assuring, because of its national scope, the proper administra-
tion of the social security system. The Court concluded that payment of
72 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
73 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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social security taxes was a part of the overall tax system and that allowing
people to withhold taxes for specific reasons, would undermine a sound
tax system. The accommodation granted by Congress allowing exemp-
tions for self-employed Amish but not others-was deemed a reasonable
and an appropriate balance of the conflicting interests.
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. While agreeing with the
Court's decision, he argued that the Court has generally not used the bal-
ancing test it so often enunciates. Stevens argued that the real basis for
this decision and all others like it (except Yoder) was that, where there is
a valid and neutral law of general applicability (for example, a law not
directly related to religious practice), then a complainant has a very high
standard to meet. Stevens supported this position based upon the neces-
sity of keeping government away from evaluating different religious
claims. Sherbert and Thomas, he felt, were correctly decided under this
standard because they involved laws arguably intended to provide bene-
fits but which forced employees to forego benefits because of their reli-
gious beliefs.
Bowen v. Roy,7 4 decided in 1986, is an important case which raises a
number of questions. A native American family refused to provide a so-
cial security number for their daughter when applying for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children on grounds that assigning such a number
would hurt their daughter's "spirit." Distinguishing Yoder, Sherbert, and
Thomas, the Court held, that where the government enforces a facially
neutral, uniformly applicable requirement for a welfare program reaching
"many millions of people,"75 then the compelling state interest test need
not be used. The effect of this conclusion is unclear, however, since two
Justices found that the case was moot, and four Justices indicated that
Sherbert and Thomas were controlling. 76 These five felt that the govern-
ment had failed to show an administrative burden outweighing the bur-
den on the applicants. Presumably, the law of Sherbert and Thomas con-
tinues to hold, but at least some of the Court's members are prepared to
acknowledge the relevance of administrative burdens when dealing with
programs involving many people and statutes which are facially neutral.
Since local land use regulations usually do not involve millions of people,
it is not likely that the case will affect the law in this area as applied by
1' 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
7 Id. at 707.
71 Id. at 720-23 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in result) (case is moot); id.
at 714-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (case may be moot); id. at 727-28 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (should apply Free Exercise Clause precedents);
id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting) (as Thomas and Sherbert control this case, "I cannot join
the Court's opinion and judgment").
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the federal courts."
B. Federal Cases in a Land Use Context
In accordance with the Supreme Court cases discussed above, lower
federal courts have begun to develop an appropriate analysis for cases
dealing with religion and land use. The most highly developed analysis
was performed by the Eleventh Circuit in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,
Florida.78 Grosz involved residents of Miami Beach who made structural
changes to an accessory structure to their single-family home which was
located in a single-family, residential district. 9 No external modifications
were made but the building was stocked with provisions for religious ser-
vices, including benches for more than thirty people, torahs,80 arks,8"
prayer books, and other religious items. The majority of people who at-
tended the services were family members, friends, or neighbors. The
owner of the building was an Orthodox Jewish rabbi who was somewhat
infirm but not immobile. As part of his religious tradition, he was re-
quired to conduct services twice daily for at least ten adult males. The
court found that while daily services created no neighborhood problems,
well-attended services disturbed neighbors as a result of the number of
people asking for directions and worshipers chanting during services. The
court noted that the Miami Beach ordinance permitted religious institu-
tions in many other residential zones"2 and that the ordinance had been
enforced in an even-handed manner.
The court outlined two threshold tests: Does the action regulate reli-
gious belief (which is never allowed) or does it regulate religious conduct
(which may be allowed)? In addition, does the law have a secular purpose
and effect (which is permitted) or a sectarian purpose and effect (which is
not)? The law must not be aimed at impeding religion nor can it have the
essential effect of a negative influence on religious activity or religious
belief. Any non-secular effects must be only incidental to the secular ef-
" A recent case involving the denial of benefits was Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987). In Hobbie, the Court held that
Florida could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who was dis-
charged for refusing, based upon religious reasons, to work on Friday evenings and Satur-
days. The Court relied upon both Sherbert and Thomas. A notable distinction is that the
plaintiff in Hobbie had converted after she started working at the place from which she was
ultimately dismissed. The Court found that the timing of conversion was not relevant.
78 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
7 Id. at 731.
80 The Torah consists of the first five books of the Old Testament and, in scroll form, is
used in Jewish religious services.
81 The structure in the service in which the Torahs are kept.
"' Grosz, 721 F.2d at 732. However, the court did not indicate how many of these other
zones are zoned for single-family residences only.
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fect.8" If an ordinance passes these two threshold tests, a court may pro-
ceed to the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme Court in the deci-
sions discussed above.
The balancing test used by the court weighed the cost to the govern-
ment of altering its activity against the cost to the religious practice of
being imposed upon by the government activity.84 The court felt that
such test would mark the path of least constitutional impairment. In per-
forming its analysis, the court examined the balancing process in terms of
two notions; the burden on government as opposed to the burden on
religion.
With respect to the burden on government, underlying policy re-
quires an examination of whether the regulation meets the "least restric-
tive means test." If the government can achieve its aims with a lesser
burden on religion, the regulation must fail. Another aspect of the inquiry
involves the impact of a religion-based exception on governmental policy
objectives. The court noted that the Supreme Court cases are ambiguous
and left open the question of the extent to which administrative costs can
be considered in such situations. It does, however, appear that where sys-
tem-wide considerations of significant moment are implicated as in Lee
(in which there would be a serious burden on the social security system),
the administrative aspects become more important. Nonetheless, as the
Eleventh Circuit concluded, there remain some significant questions re-
garding this matter.
In terms of burden on religion, there is a hierarchy, to some extent,
of burdens. For example, an ordinance which places criminal sanctions on
a religious practice creates the heaviest burden.85 This is very clear in its
effect. However, below this impact are lesser infringements on religion.
These, the court noted, are less clear in their effects. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit determined that no Supreme Court decision subsequent to Sherbert
has used the direct-indirect effect test.86 However, where the action con-
centrates directly on conduct, then the courts will perceive a serious
imposition.
Finally, the court required the weighing of competing interests.
Courts should render a decision against the government where the gov-
ernment can easily achieve its policy interests without an undue burden
on religion. If the burden on religion is zero, then there should be a deci-
sion in favor of the government. Where, however, the action passes the
threshold tests of conduct focus and secular purpose and effect, the bur-
Id. at 733-34 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 607).
84 Id. at 734.
88 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
307-08 (1940).
88 Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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den on government and the burden on religion are balanced by requiring
the government to demonstrate a compelling state interest. The Eleventh
Circuit emphasized that, where "avoiding the burden on government rises
to the very upper ranges of government interest, a free exercise challenge
will fail."87
In Grosz, the court then began with the threshold tests and main-
tained that the law affected conduct-prayer and religious service-as op-
posed to belief that the purposes of the ordinance were non-sectarian.
Therefore, the court concluded that the balancing test was in order. In
weighing the burden on government, the court stated that the religious
services produced noise and crowds and that neighbors had complained
about the services. Consequently, it determined that the religious conduct
was clearly inconsistent with the governmental action under the police
power, which action easily passed the least restrictive means test. The
court also determined that granting an exemption for religion would de-
feat the city zoning policy in all areas of the city in which a religious
exemption was granted, thus there was much weight on the government's
side of the equation.
The court proceeded to discuss the effect on religion. Since the rabbi
needed ten adult men twice a day for services, he would solicit in the
neighborhood to find such a group. The court stated that the soliciting
was objectionable and "non-essential" but, nonetheless, aided the reli-
gious conduct.88 Consequently, there was some degree of burden on first
amendment rights. The court, however, maintained that this burden fell
on the lower end of the spectrum. Services could be conducted in other
parts of the city and the penalties for noncompliance with the law did not
rise to the level of criminal liability, loss of livelihood, or the denial of a
basic, income-sustaining public welfare benefit."
The court then went on to determine a final balance. Citing Prince v.
Massachusetts0 and International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.
Eaves" for the proposition that government can place reasonable restric-
tions on the time, place, and manner of conduct, the court held that this
ordinance could stand. The court also relied upon Lakewood, Ohio Con-
gregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,9 2 in which
the Sixth Circuit held that a city's interest in creating residential districts
87 Grosz, 721 F.2d at 737.
88 This conduct was, in fact, the basis for the city's notice of violation.
89 The court cited Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (criminal liability); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (same); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (loss
of livelihood); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (loss of employment compen-
sation).
90 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944).
91 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979).
92 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
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outweighed a congregation's religious interests. The Grosz court found
that Lakewood was especially appropriate because it was even a closer
case; religious services could be held on only ten percent of the land in
Lakewood as opposed to almost half in the Miami case.
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood" was indeed a closer case. It involved a church, which was op-
erating out of a storefront and looking for a more suitable home, in a
Cleveland suburb with a population of 62,000. The church took out an
option to purchase land which fronted on a six lane east-west thorough-
fare and a north-south secondary route. Despite the highway location, the
surrounding neighborhood consisted of large one and two-family homes.
The church was initially denied an exception to the residential zoning on
the grounds of noise and traffic hazards. After a comprehensive rezoning
of the city, the zoning ordinance still left the property in a single-family
district which did not permit churches and the church was again refused
a building permit.
The Lakewood court performed an analysis which was simpler than
the one performed by the Grosz court. Upon examining the nature of the
religious observance and the burden placed on that observance, the court
held that owning a building was a desirable aspect of operating a church
but was not a necessary religious tenet. The court concluded that the bur-
dens imposed were of an indirect, financial and aesthetic nature and that
the congregation was not forced to choose between abandoning its beliefs
or preserving the zoning code. The court also found that, even though
only ten percent of the land in Lakewood was suitable for a new church,
if the church wished to build in a residential area it could purchase other
churches or build in the part of the city which permitted such churches.
The Lakewood court held that the first amendment does not compel
a city to make the cheapest or most beautiful land available for churches.
The conclusion of the case was that, while the effect of the ordinance was
to make the practice of religion more expensive, this was not a sufficient
reason to overturn the ordinance because it did not force the congregation
to abandon religious beliefs through financial or criminal penalties. More-
over, no tax was placed on the exercise of religion. Therefore, the court
held that there was no infringement of religious freedom and the case
must be decided by reference to ordinary due process analysis. In per-
forming this analysis, the court relied heavily on the Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.9 4 and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas95 for the proposition
that cities have substantial power to determine their residential
environments.
93 Id.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
" 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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The Grosz and Lakewood decisions have been very influential and
other federal courts have begun to follow their approach, although not
always with the same results. In Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rock-
land, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo,9" a court followed Grosz in balancing the
burden on the community against the burden on religious interests. The
court argued that where the issue is regulation of an activity deemed sec-
ular (a religious nursery school), the burden on religious interests is light
and a wide range of restrictions can be justified. This is especially true
where, as in this case, fire and safety regulations are involved. On the
other side, in Jehovah's Witnesses Assembly Halls of New Jersey, Inc. v.
City of Jersey City,97 a court held that where religious worship resembled
a commercial usage (for example, use of a theater for religious assemblies
that could parallel commercial theater use in terms of impacts), a city
could not prohibit the usage. This does not necessarily reflect disagree-
ment with the Lakewood analysis but perhaps evinces a conclusion here
that, under these facts the burden on religion is unjustified.
V. CUTTING THROUGH THE THICKET
It is suggested that nothing short of a definitive Supreme Court deci-
sion will give a firm direction to judges deciding free exercise cases involv-
ing the zoning process. The purpose of this section is to provide some
guidance as to how specific aspects of zoning relate to the Supreme Court
decisions involving the free exercise clause. First, it is essential to begin
by analyzing what is clear in this area. If anything is clear, it is that the
Supreme Court decisions emphasize that governments run into trouble
when they enact legislation forcing individuals to choose between their
religious practices and their observance of the law. Second, zoning regu-
lates activities in space. It is thus different from the typical free exercise
problem with which the courts are confronted. Third, the compelling
state interest test will be used in the event of a burden on religion which
is substantial enough to implicate the free exercise clause. If the clause is
not implicated, then the traditional rational basis test will be used. In the
zoning field, the Court has been reluctant to find that ordinances violate
fundamental rights which would require use of the compelling state inter-
est test.98 As a practical matter, the test used will determine the outcome.
Since land use considerations are likely to be important in a community's
decision-making process, but rarely involve questions of a compelling
state interest, the crucial issue in zoning cases is likely to turn on the
" 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
9" 597 F. Supp. 972 (D.N.J. 1984).
" See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Cf. Pearlman, The Closing Door:
The Supreme Court and Residential Segregation, 44 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 160 (1978).
ZONING
extent to which a zoning ordinance impinges on the religious practices of
individuals or congregations. An essential fact about zoning is that it
deals with relationships in spatial dimensions. Zoning laws are peculiar in
that they are not really laws of general applicability but are, rather,
linked to individual properties." It is this feature which makes much of
zoning law difficult to deal with in the same manner as other laws.
Considering the test set forth in Grosz, it is necessary to analyze how
it relates to zoning in a broad sense. As to the threshold tests-whether
the law regulates religious beliefs as opposed to conduct and whether it
has a sectarian purpose and effect-it is generally the case that zoning
laws will pose no problems. Zoning regulates uses of space, and what goes
on in those uses is of little concern to government unless there are exter-
nal impacts, which impacts zoning laws attempt to control. 00 Similarly,
the nature of zoning as a comprehensive, rational measure of land use
means that zoning laws are unlikely to have a sectarian purpose. This is
not to say that they cannot, but the situation is unlikely.
Regarding the burdens imposed on religion by zoning ordinances, it
is important to recognize that there are very few burdens of a direct na-
ture. This is because religious practices rarely have a spatial nature. In-
deed, this appears to be extremely rare. One significant example is Ortho-
dox Judaism, which places restrictions on travel by Orthodox Jews on the
Sabbath. One must walk to services.0 1 In essence, where zoning makes
the action of practicing a religion more expensive or more difficult, but
does not force a participant to choose, there is no direct burden and the
compelling state interest test need not be invoked.'0 2
The sparse federal case law on the subject tends to confirm the state
court pattern of generally finding unconstitutional those ordinances
which totally exclude religious uses from a city. Consequently, it would be
For a discussion of the peculiar nature of zoning law, see Pearlman, supra note 9.
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1970).
101 The issue of religious Jews and their ability to attend religious services came up in Con-
gregation Dovid Ben Nuchim v. City of Oak Park, 40 Mich. App. 698, 199 N.W.2d 557
(1972). In this case, religious Jews, unable to ride to services, wished to build a synagogue in
a residential area. The Michigan court, relying on Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333
Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952), which accorded favored status to religion and prohibited
the restriction of religious uses from an entire community, granted a decision in favor of the
religious members. Presumably, for Orthodox Jews, the inability to ride to services operates
as a prohibition.
202 For example, in Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, discussed supra text and accompanying notes 92-93, the court found that where
a zoning ordinance made it more difficult for a church to build and own a new building,
there was no direct interference because a fundamental tenet of the church's religious be-
liefs was not involved. The church could meet in other places throughout the city but not in
the residential zone in question.
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difficult for a community to show that it requires such a regulation and,
moreover, that its need for such a regulation is outweighed by the burden
placed on religious observers.108 Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine
such a situation, perhaps in a very small community in a more or less
continuously populated megalopolis, where special problems of traffic and
land use exist and where there is very close access to religious institutions
nearby. In this situation, it is reasonable to consider driving time or dis-
tance rather than political boundaries as the important factor. Regard-
less, it appears unlikely that the courts will generally countenance total
prohibition.0 4
Total exclusion is relatively unlikely in any event, and would proba-
bly be considered a violation of the free exercise clause."'5 What is much
more common is the exclusion of churches from residential areas. Again,
in many instances, it is unlikely that churches would be excluded from all
residential areas. The constitutionality of such an ordinance would be du-
bious. What serious burdens could churches in high density, residential
areas pose that are of significantly greater impact than the high density,
residential areas themselves? Other nonresidential uses are frequently al-
lowed in high density neighborhoods and churches would not seem to be
very different. Most problems caused by churches could be handled in
some manner other than exclusion, thus raising the least intrusive means
issue.10o
The most common problem is the exclusion of churches from some
part of a community. Most frequently this takes the form of exclusion
from low density, residential districts. As discussed above, most state
courts have prohibited this exercise of the zoning power.107 The typical
justification for not allowing exclusion in this instance is that the exis-
tence of churches in residential neighborhoods is beneficial to the com-
munity and actively promotes the police power. Therefore, exclusion
through zoning becomes arbitrary, since zoning fails to promote this ben-
eficial influence. This type of reasoning in connection with other zoning
issues is relatively rare. Generally, zoning is used to prevent unwanted
103 See Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 740 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 827 (1984); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lake-
wood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
104 This accords with decisions involving the free speech aspects of the first amendment.
See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
'05 Cf. Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952).
106 There are other reasons given for overturning ordinances that are not discussed in this
article, but may be relevant. In this context, courts do not look favorably on situations
where certain types of intense uses are allowed but churches are excluded. See Ellsworth v.
Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945). See also 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra
note 47, § 20.01 & n.7.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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situations.108 On occasion, it may be used to promote "positive" goals.10 9
It is rare, however, for courts to hold that zoning must permit an
activity because it is a positive benefit to the community, since it is usu-
ally up to the community to make its determination as to what it consid-
ers beneficial. One exception is Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mt. Laurel,110 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that providing for low- and moderate-income housing was a required pur-
pose of zoning under the New Jersey Constitution. Mt. Laurel represents
at least one major example of a court imposing specific requirements on
zoning ordinances by determining that certain values are, in effect,
mandatory."1
Mandatory requirements are not only rare in the context of zoning
but they can also represent an usurpation of legislative power. Essen-
tially, unless there is some constitutional requirement clearly expressed,
an argument that freedom to locate churches in residential areas is im-
portant enough to make location restricitions arbitrary can result, in ef-
fect, in substitution of the judgment of the court for that of the commu-
nity. The issue should not be what is necessary but rather what can a
community reasonably find and do through its legislative power. At the
same time, it is necessary to recognize that religion is an issue which must
be handled with more than usual care."1
In the area of religion, if the decision is based on state constitutional
requirements, then federal court interpretation may be of lesser impor-
108 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The constitutional justification for
zoning is the prevention of nuisances, with allowance for a reasonable margin of error as to
what constitutes a nuisance. Id. at 388.
"' See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In Belle Terre, the court allowed
zoning to be used to promote desired lifestyles-single-family quiet residential living. Id. at
9.
... 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); cf.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390
(1983) (discussing specific action mandated by Mt. Laurel).
... Mt. Laurel is not the only instance, although it is perhaps the most significant. See also
Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971). In Bristow, where
the court held that mobile home parks were to be given preferred status because they pro-
tected the public interest. The Michigan Supreme Court has also held that mobile homes
cannot be excluded from residential districts. See Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293,
302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
"' One argument that can also be made is that in the Mt. Laurel case, the mandatory
requirements are directly related to purposes which are central to zoning: where people live
and how communities can deal with growth. In the case of religion, however, religious pur-
poses are being held of such importance because of factors central to other questions (for
example, our country's traditional respect for the importance of free religious expression).
This comparison does not make religious expression any less important, but does suggest
that there may be closer connections between the need for mandatory requirements where
the requirement deals with issues touching on the centrality of the zoning process itself.
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tance since state constitutions may be found to set higher standards on
this subject than the federal constitution. Where a state court has simply
found that churches in residential neighborhoods promote the police
power, the federal cases may be of greater value since the Supreme Court,
by dismissing the Porterville case for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion,1 clearly demonstrated that it does not feel that the presence of
religious institutions in a residential neighborhood is compelled. Further-
more, in a subsequent case, American Communications Association v.
Douds,1 " the Supreme Court stated that it dismissed the Porterville case
because there was a relatively small interest to be protected under the
free exercise clause by preventing the building of churches in residential
areas.
VI. EMERGING TRENDS
Recently, a number of states have begun to apply a balancing test to
this issue. Some recent cases suggest that at least some state courts may
well be liberalizing their thinking; deciding zoning cases not with a fixed
standard but rather with the flexibility and sensitivity which zoning de-
mands. This is not, however, universally true. The newer cases recognize
that religious uses are better suited to certain areas than to others. For
example, in Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward,1 5 the Alaska Su-
preme Court, recognizing that total exclusion of church uses would be
unconstitutional, found that churches, like other intensive uses, are not
entitled to be free from reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
This case involved a church school and the court stated that it was per-
fectly proper to locate the school where its "impact on surrounding par-
cels is lessened." ''1 The court concluded that as long as an ordinance pro-
vides adequate areas for zoning for religious purposes,' exclusion from
specific parcels of land is legitimate where such exclusion furthers a legiti-
mate land use objective.
This concept of adequate zoned space for church uses raises some
questions with respect to what is adequate and how adequacy is to be
determined. 7 Does the city have to meet every demand for church usage
or is there some point at which it can say that no more land suitable for
churches is available? Presumably, the Seward court would hold that rea-
sonable land use justifications would suffice. Absent that sort of situation,
13 Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City
of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
339 U.S. 382, 397-98 (1950).
"' 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
"i Id. at 1301.
'" For a discussion of adequate availability in another context, see Pearlman, supra note 1,
at 272-74.
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the court would likely examine the facts of each case and weigh the bal-
ances. The bottom line for the Seward court was the doctrine expressed
in the Supreme Court cases examined herein; the free exercise clause
comes into play when a state forces individuals to choose between com-
plying with a law and complying with the dictates of their religion.118
One area in which the regulation of religious action has occurred in-
volves uses not devoted directly to prayer. Most frequently, this type of
regulation involves the operation of a church as a religious school or the
use of a church for some form of communal living. These situations often
involve the free exercise clause because churches claim that such uses are
an integral part of their operations or, indeed, of their beliefs. However,
because these uses are frequently further from the direct idea of religious
expression, courts are more likely to uphold reasonable regulation. This is
in the context, of course, of Supreme Court decisions allowing persons
with religious beliefs to define what constitutes their religion. " 9 Nonethe-
less, when such beliefs are expressed as action, the courts are more willing
to subject such activities to time, place, and manner regulations.
Perhaps the case which has best raised such issues, albeit in a non-
zoning case, was International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.
Eaves. 120 There, the Fifth Circuit upheld, in pertinent part, an Atlanta
ordinance which regulated the solicitation of funds in airports. The ordi-
nance required that donations to organizations only take place at desig-
nated solicitation booths in the airport. To the religious group involved,
accepting money was as much a religious act as proselytizing or praying.
The group urged that regulation of solicitation was thus regulation on the
basis of content and, consequently, unconstitutional. The court rejected
this argument and concluded that, while soliciting of money may be a
genuine religious act, it was still conduct which could be regulated. The
regulation did not deal with any religious aspects of the activity but
merely with the "mechanical, non-communicative aspects of transferring
money.'1 2' It was not aimed at religious activity and served important
governmental interests in relieving airport congestion. Therefore, the
court held that the regulation was a valid time, place, and manner
restriction.
Similarly, in zoning cases, issues of this type are subject to the same
Seward, 655 P.2d at 1301. However, not all state courts treat accompanying educational
uses as casually. See City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358
(1982) (involving an injunction to close down an existing church school in a church).
"' See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Em-
ployment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
120 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979).
"I Id. at 828.
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type of analysis. In Abram v. City of Fayetteville,'122 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court upheld the denial of a conditional use permit for operation
of a parochial school in a church that had previously received a condi-
tional use permit to operate in a single-family zoning district. The church
argued that the school was an integral part of the function of a church.
The court noted that operation of a full-time, parochial school was a
much more intense use than a church and that different requirements
could be applied to it.1 23 The court relied on the repeated Supreme Court
dismissals for want of substantial federal question of cases allowing rea-
sonable time, place, and manner regulation 12  and found that an ordi-
nance allowing parochial schools as conditional uses enables a community
to balance substantial community concerns against religious needs. The
court noted that an ordinance which totally excludes parochial schools
might be a different case but that a community could locate these uses
where their impacts on other land would be minimized.
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. In Antrim Faith Bap-
tist Church v. Commonwealth,'2" a Pennsylvania Court held that, al-
though a parochial school was an integral part of a church ministry, it
could still be subject to fire safety installation requirements when a vari-
ance is granted to enable the school to operate. In Hull v. Miami Shores
Village, 26 a Florida court held that a law allowing churches in single-
family districts did not permit a church to use eighty percent of a build-
ing to administer services to the entire archdiocese of 135 parishes. Al-
though this case was basically a "primary use" case (what was the pri-
mary use of the structure?) rather than a first amendment decision, the
implication of the decision is that a local government has the right to
regulate church uses. It is noteworthy that the court stated that it was
regularly called upon to consider the applicability of zoning ordinances to
religious groups. 1 27
It may also be that if there are strong overriding considerations,
courts will look to the purposes of regulation. In Southern New England
122 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983).
122 Id. at 65, 661 S.W.2d at 372. The school operated from 8:30 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. each week-
day. It was, therefore, not simply a school for teaching religious doctrine to members. The
court did not consider this but, if it did, would perhaps have reached a different conclusion,
and reasonably so, since the religious school use is much less likely to have significant im-
pacts compared with those of a full-fledged parochial school.
1"4 See Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273
(1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); cf. American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397-98 (1950) (relatively small interest to be protected by preventing
the building of churches in residential areas).
122 75 Pa. Commw. 61, 460 A.2d 1228 (1983).
120 435 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
117 Id. at 869, n.1.
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Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Town of Burling-
ton,""' the court upheld a town bylaw that zoned as wetlands the property
on which a church sought to place a building. The church argued that a
state law prohibiting the restriction of the use of land for religious pur-
poses (except for reasonable area regulations) exempted the property
from the wetlands designation in a zoning ordinance. 12 The court held
that a general purpose of the state wetlands laws was to protect wetland
areas and, therefore, more stringent local regulation through a zoning or-
dinance was permitted.
Not all of the cases, however, point to a conclusive trend. A special
case in point is the New Jersey decision in State v. Cameron.'30 In Cam-
eron, the lower court appeared to follow the federal case pattern. 3' Hold-
ing that a zoning ordinance may prohibit a preacher from conducting ser-
vices in his home, the court stated that values relating to quietness and
seclusion, as well as to the maintenance of property values, are sufficient
to balance the ledger. This decision was reversed by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court. The reversal resulted in more questions than answers and,
through the concurring and dissenting opinions, raised some important
issues. 82 The majority held that, where an ordinance excludes "churches
and similar places of worship" from a residential use district, it cannot be
used to prohibit a minister from temporarily using his home for a one-
hour religious service each week for approximately twenty-five people.
The court maintained that where religious activity is involved, potential
vagueness has to be interpreted against the community and that failure
to otherwise define "church" made it unclear as to whether the ordinance
applied to this type of use. The majority further maintained that
"church" implies a certain type of structure which is architecturally
designed for certain religious functions and, unless otherwise defined in
an ordinance, it is unclear whether it could apply to the minister or his
house.
The majority acknowledged, however, that cities can regulate other
kinds of uses in private homes and can exercise the police power to deal
with problems of traffic, noise, and similar features. Presumably, if the
ordinance were "sufficiently directed against the tangible detrimental ef-
fects of particular conduct,"' 8 a community could exclude churches from
IU 21 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 490 N.E.2d 451 (1981).
120 Id. at 705, 490 N.E.2d at 454. The Church did agree the town could regulate it under
general wetlands law forever.
" 100 N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985).
. See 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (Law. Div. 1982), afl'd, 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460
A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 100 N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985).
... 100 N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985).
" Id. at 601, 498 A.2d at 1225.
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at least some residential zones. A concurring opinion by Justice Clifford
argued that the court should not have reached a decision based upon the
vagueness question but, instead, should have held that the community
did not have the power to regulate religious activities in private homes
and that the power to affect religious activities in residential districts has
clear limits."3 4
Justice Garibaldi dissented, arguing that the definition of "church"
involved a use and not a type of structure and that regular use of a house
as a site for religious services constituted a church. She concluded that
the regulation did not deprive the minister of any constitutional rights,
citing the Sixth Circuit's Lakewood decision'3 5 as "strikingly similar" to
the case at bar.'"8 Justice Garibaldi proceeded to argue that it is neces-
sary to look on zoning as part of a whole planning scheme and to not
simply consider zoning issues on a case-by-case basis. Because the major-
ity did not reach the substantive issues, it is unclear what the law is in
New Jersey today. Although the majority's reliance on vagueness perhaps
indicates a desire to avoid the major issue, at least certain language in the
majority decision gives credence to some zoning power to regulate reli-
gious uses. The Cameron case thus suggests that there may be a middle
ground in New Jersey state court decisions.3 7
There are some very hard line views being expressed. In City of Sum-
ner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner,' the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, in what strikes this author as an extreme decision,13 9 held that,
where a church fails to comply with a building and. zoning code in the
operation of a school facility, the community nonetheless has to adopt a
"I Id. at 606, 498 A.2d at 1227 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford cited two New
York cases to support this position: Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board of Town of
Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956); and Westchester Reform
Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
"I Cameron, 100 N.J. at 614-15, 498 A.2d at 1231-32 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); see Lake-
wood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
136 Cameron, 100 N.J. at 614, 498 A.2d at 1231.
"I However, lower courts have taken a rather hard line. Thus, in St. John's Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935 (1983), the court
held that a church operation of a shelter for the homeless was a religious use and harm to
the community if the shelter were closed far outweighed inconvenience to the community if
it remained open. Id. at 421-22, 479 A.2d at 939. The court, thus, appears to be engaging in
policy making since it concludes that the government needs assistance in dealing with the
problem of the homeless. An even harder line decision was issued in Farhi v. Commissioners
of Borough of Deal, 204 N.J. Super. 575, 499 A.2d 559 (Law Div. 1985), in which the court
held that religious worship in the home could not be regulated in any way absent an over-
riding governmental interest. Id. at 584-85, 499 A.2d at 564.
138 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
39 It has struck at least one other commentator in the same way. See Note, Constitutional
Review, supra note 69.
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flexible attitude toward that use. What makes this case a real test is that
school safety standards were at issue. The basement of the church met
standards for churches but failed to meet school safety standards. The
court held that no attempt had been made to show that the safety stan-
dards were necessary in the particular circumstances involved and that
applying the standards would force the school to shut down. In order to
satisfy the first amendment, the court had to weigh the city's concerns
against the impact on the church and the court determined that there
was insufficient evidence on this point. Therefore, the case was remanded
to obtain this evidence and to determine other issues as well.
The decision produced a flurry of concurring and dissenting opinions.
Three judges (one concurring and two dissenting) made a number of im-
portant points. Judge Williams, concurring with the remand, expressed
the view that, while balancing of positions has to take place, it was not for
the court to disregard the city's conclusion that the safety of the children
was at stake. Reasonable fire regulations, he argued, were minimal intru-
sions. Judge Dolliver, dissenting, (joined by Judge Rosellini) argued that,
unlike the Supreme Court cases of Yoder and Thomas, which were cited
by the majority, this case did not force an unalterable choice between
religious belief and observance of the law since the church could choose to
comply with the code.140
The case is troubling because it shows the extreme to which a court's
deference to religious views can go. Although fire regulations may be of
more immediate concern than zoning regulations, the same principles
ought to apply. It should also be noted that the school failed to comply
with the city's zoning code as well. As long as the effect of the regulation
is indirect, not aimed at religious groups, and does not force a choice be-
tween religion and city ordinances, the courts should defer to reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations. Moreover, the case is of special con-
cern because the majority used the major Supreme Court decisions to
support its conclusion even though the Supreme Court cases deal much
more closely with real choices between conformity to an ordinance and
religious belief. The Sumner court does not, unlike other state courts,
rely on the police power argument or a state constitution but, instead,
relies on the United States Supreme Court decisions.
Finally, an Indiana court has recently reiterated the Indiana position
which does not favor restrictions on churches. While holding that
churches can be subject to reasonable restrictions, in Milharcic v. Metro-
14 Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 20-21, 639 P.2d at 1369 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). There was
some dispute about the church's financial ability to comply but, although the church raised
this issue, apparently no evidence was presented to support this contention. Id. at 20, 639
P.2d at 1369.
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politan Board of Zoning Appeals of Marion County (Division II).41 an
Indiana court held that a church could not be excluded from a residential
zone and that a use variance request by a church could not be denied. If
some state courts will not take the Porterville hint, then the Supreme
Court needs to clarify the matter as soon as a suitable case is presented.
Otherwise, communities in many states will be left with an uncertain view
of their powers in this area.
VII. CONCLUSION
After examining the various cases, the question remains whether the
new trend toward balancing religious uses and community interest ought
to be encouraged. In light of the Supreme Court's strong statements
about the valuable public purposes served by zoning and examination of
the very real impacts on churches, the trend would appear to make sense.
Except for the relatively few instances of total prohibition, most zoning
laws do no totally eliminate religious uses throughout the community.
They are not aimed at content, nor do they regulate belief. They also do
not, as far as location is concerned, directly require anyone to act in a
manner inconsistent with religious beliefs (except possibly for Orthodox
Jews), although restrictions on living arrangements within churches have
produced a number of situations which must be analyzed with extra sen-
sitivity. The zoning laws do not condition benefits upon performance of
actions contrary to religious beliefs. Indeed, in large measure, they do not
force individuals to choose between religious practice and beliefs or obe-
dience to zoning law. Moreover, they tend to place only minimal burdens
on religious uses.
If there is a problem with certain of the courts' analyses of this situa-
tion, it seems to this author that much of the analysis ignores the real
difference between zoning legislation and other types of legislation. As
noted above, the Supreme Court has given strong support to the public
purposes chosen by local legislative bodies. Tests that require local gov-
ernments to justify their actions as based upon significant purpose miss
the point that their actions in passing a genuinely comprehensive zoning
ordinance are already likely to have strong policy concerns at their base.
Thus, while religious uses are perhaps entitled to special sensitivity in the
analysis, any analysis that fails to recognize that the zoning ordinance is a
reflection of policy choices (not just what is necessary) that are of impor-
tance to the community will fail to do justice to the issues at hand. The
federal courts have recognized this point and are beginning to work out a
framework of analysis that recognizes the reality of the zoning situation.
It is not yet clearly definitive and will not be until the Supreme Court
141 489 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
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considers the questions that the lower courts are raising. However, the
framework provides a better recognition of the real balancing involved in
issues that are fundamental to both planning and religion.

